Six defects found by running the thing rather than reading it. The
previous change was verified by bundling, by tests, and by the container
images — none of which start a Worker, so every one of these was invisible.
**`bun dev` did not start.** It ran one multi-config process, which does
not connect a service binding between the workers it loads; the API
reported `AUTH [not connected]` and could not verify a token. It is two
processes now, which is what the dev registry connects, and the second is
backgrounded with the first killed on exit so stopping the pair stops both.
**Neither server could bind.** Wrangler resolves `localhost` and takes
`::1` first; a host with no IPv6 address on its loopback dies with a bind
error from inside the runtime that names neither the app nor the port.
`dev.ip` is pinned to `127.0.0.1`, and `inspector_port` is now distinct per
app — it is not derived from the port above, so the second server to start
died on an address already in use.
**The API worker failed to evaluate.** A specifier ending in `.sql` is
claimed by the bundler as a module of its own, so the schema file was
emitted verbatim beside the bundle and the runtime threw on an export it
could not find. The route was reaching past the domain module into the
schema to spell a status; it now asks the domain module, which is the rule
everywhere else here and happens to also avoid the hazard.
**Signing in failed on the second request that touched the database.** A
pool is cached per connection string, and on a Worker an I/O object created
while handling one request may not be touched while handling another. The
first request always succeeded, which is why it went unnoticed — a sign-in
is several. The cache is now kept only where a process outlives its
requests, which is the case it was added for.
**The images named a base that podman will not resolve.** A short name
needs a registry; the database service alongside them already spelled one.
**Compose pinned container names.** The name is not scoped to the project,
so a second checkout got the same three, and `down` in one stopped the
other's containers. This is not hypothetical — it stopped a running
development database while this was being tested.
Verified by signing in end to end against both dev servers: a code
requested over HTTP, read from the issuer's log, redeemed, exchanged for
tokens, and presented to the API, which resolved it to the account the
sign-in had just created.
Three things review caught, and one shape correction.
**No credential has a default any more.** The compose file shipped
`ADMIN_SHARED_SECRET` falling back to a value written in this repository —
and that header bypasses token verification entirely, so anyone reading
the file could act as an operator against any deployment that had not
overridden it. A default is worth less than it looks here: the deployment
that never set the variable is exactly the one where the default is public.
Every credential now comes from `.env`, and compose refuses to start naming
the variable it wanted. That also takes the last literal password out of a
tracked file.
**The origin ports are on loopback.** Both services speak plain HTTP and
mark no cookie `Secure`, because both expect to sit behind something that
terminates TLS. Published on every interface they were a way to reach the
issuer around that proxy, with sign-in codes and tokens in clear text.
**Mail settings are passed through rather than fixed.** The issuer was
pinned to printing sign-in codes to its log, and the three delivery
settings never reached it — so the documented way to configure mail could
not work, and every code and recipient went to the container log instead.
Printing codes is now asked for in `.env` like everything else, and with
nothing configured the issuer refuses to send rather than logging.
**Sandbox becomes a domain rather than a prefix.** `api.sandbox.nestri.io`
and `auth.sandbox.nestri.io`, because sandbox holds whatever is not
production and that set grows. One certificate for `*.sandbox.nestri.io`
then covers all of it, including unpredictable per-pull-request names,
and cannot be presented for production's own domain — which the zone-wide
wildcard the previous shape leaned on could.
Also drops `STEAM_API_KEY`. It was declared in two type definitions and
read by nothing: linking an account makes no outbound call that needs it.
Moving the issuer's state into Postgres removed the last thing that tied
either app to one hosting provider. What was left was a deployment tool
describing resources that no longer existed — so this replaces it with
`wrangler`, which is what actually deploys a Worker, and adds a second way
to run each app that involves no provider at all.
Each app now has a `wrangler.jsonc` with an environment per stage, and a
`Dockerfile` beside it. The handler is the same one in both cases; what
differs is only where its settings come from. Two of them gained a second
spelling so that nothing has to branch on the runtime: Postgres arrives as
a pooled binding or as `DATABASE_URL`, and the route to the issuer is a
service binding or `AUTH_INTERNAL_URL`.
That last one is new, and it is a split the binding was already making
without saying so. `AUTH_ISSUER_URL` has to be the issuer's public name,
because it is compared literally against every token's `iss` claim — but
the public name is often not routable from inside a deployment. So the
name and the route are two settings now rather than one that cannot be
both.
DNS moves out of code and into `docs/dns.md`, which lists every hostname
and what it is for. Six records that change roughly never did not need a
tool, and the table outlives whatever is answering the names — which is
the point, since some of them will stop being Workers. The sandbox
hostnames are hyphenated rather than nested for the same reason: a
certificate covering `*.nestri.io` covers one label and not two, so
`api-sandbox.nestri.io` can become an ordinary origin later without a
certificate having to be ordered for it first.
Also drops `EMAIL_DEV_LOG` from committed configuration into `.dev.vars`,
which `wrangler deploy` cannot upload. Printing a live sign-in code to a
log should not be one forgotten override away from production.
