Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Wanjohi
f25c9af545 feat(auth): keep issuer state in Postgres
The issuer kept everything behind one get/set/remove/scan interface, which
is what a library that must run on any provider's cache can offer. Three of
the things kept there could not actually be served by it.

An authorization code must be redeemable once and a refresh token spendable
once, and through get and set the check and the write are separate steps —
so two requests arriving together both read an unspent record, and both mint
a session. In the refresh case that also means the reuse which reveals a
stolen token is never recorded, because recording it is the write that the
second caller overwrites. Each now has a table and an interface of its own:
redeeming is one `delete ... returning`, spending is one
`update ... where time_used is null returning *`, so exactly one caller is
ever told it went first. This is the same argument the device grant already
made, applied to the two records that had it too.

Signing keys move for a different reason. Nothing races for them; they are
the one record whose loss ends every session at once, and a cache is a place
things may be evicted from. They are retired by setting a column rather than
deleted, so the tokens they signed stay verifiable until they expire.

Both credential tables store a hash and never the credential, as the device
grant does. An authorization code travels in a query string and so passes
through history, referrer headers and any log along the redirect; a refresh
token resumes a session outright.

What is left in the generic store is the rate-limit counters — written far
more often than read, meaningless within the hour, and allowed to be
approximate, since a lost increment costs one guess out of ten. Those move
to Postgres too, so the only key-value binding this deploys with is gone and
the control plane's state is one database. That was the point: nothing here
now depends on a primitive a self-hoster cannot run.

The generic scan also gained the separator on its prefix, so scanning `a`
cannot return what is under `ab` — subjects and email addresses are both
prefixes of longer subjects and email addresses.

Deploying this signs everyone out. The signing keys and refresh tokens are
in a store that is being left behind, so the issuer starts with a fresh key
set and every existing token stops verifying.
2026-09-05 13:56:39 +03:00
Wanjohi
2c4e9d9b0b fix(auth): refuse to send a sign-in code rather than log one
The rule was "throw when the environment says production, otherwise log
the code and carry on". The deployment sets no such marker, so the
branch that ran was the developer one: every recipient and every usable
sign-in code printed to a retained log, the screen reporting success,
and nobody receiving anything.

That is what a fail-open default costs. The deployment that forgets its
mail settings is exactly the deployment with no marker saying it is a
real one, so it takes the lenient branch precisely when it should not.

Turned around: printing a live code is asked for by name and anything
else is an error, so absence of configuration is a refusal instead of an
assumption. Two settings out of three is also an error now, because it
means somebody is halfway through wiring a provider up and a quiet
fallback would hide the missing half.

Stages anyone else can reach are checked at deploy time, so a missing
setting stops the deploy with the name of the variable it wanted rather
than surfacing later as a person waiting for mail that never comes.
2026-09-05 09:27:49 +03:00
Wanjohi
affe1e3c73 refactor(auth): serve one provider, and make it the email one
Signing in with a gaming account or with an SSH key could both bring a
user into existence. That makes an account only as recoverable as the
thing that created it, and gives one person as many accounts as they
have gaming logins — neither of which is what an account is supposed to
be now that verifying an address is what creates one.

Both are unwired rather than deleted. The provider implementations stay
where they are, because connecting a gaming account is still something
this product does; it just does it from the API, against a user who
already exists, which is a connection hanging off an identity rather
than an identity of its own.

The worker test followed: it exercised the two flows that are gone, and
now covers the one that is left plus an assertion that the other two are
not routed, so they cannot come back quietly.
2026-09-05 09:27:38 +03:00
Wanjohi
0143849129 feat: bring the control plane up to date
Squashes the current state of the internal working tree onto this history.
The two trees had grown apart with no common ancestor, so this is a content
sync rather than a merge, and the published history is preserved rather than
rewritten — a force-push here would break every existing fork and clone to no
benefit.

What lands:

- Waitlist: API route, core module, and migration 0006 alongside game aliases.
- User verification.
- CI, oxfmt config, editor settings.
- Assorted fixes across the API routes and core modules.

The repository's own README, the wordmark and the per-package READMEs are kept
from this side; the internal tree had dropped them and they are what a stranger
arriving here reads first.

The marketing site in the internal tree is deliberately not here. It is a
separate product with its own repo and its own licence, and this repo is the
open one — a closed component does not belong in it regardless of how convenient
the directory looked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 17:48:46 +03:00
Wanjohi
a8b9a11de0 chore: Update Readme 2026-08-06 22:32:33 +03:00
Wanjohi
3faac3008f feat: Sync to OSS repo 2026-08-06 22:13:51 +03:00