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9
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Wanjohi
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757ff79233 |
feat(core,api): take payment, and let the provider decide who is paid up
Checkout, the customer portal, and the webhook that moves a team's plan. Nothing money-shaped is stored. No price, no currency, no card detail — a subscription's existence and its state are the whole of what crosses back, because they are the only two facts the product needs and anything more would be a second copy of a record somebody else is authoritative for. Currency is deliberately not ours to hold. A product carries a price per currency on their side and the customer's location picks one at checkout, so there is no figure in this API that could drift from the one somebody is charged. The team id travels as the customer's external id, which keeps the mapping on their side rather than putting a foreign primary key in our schema. Access follows their state, and the interesting cases are where that is not the same as "paying right now". Cancelling keeps the plan: they paid to the end of the period and turning them off when they click it takes something they bought. A failed card keeps it too, because a retry that ends in payment should not have cost them access in the middle. Only a revoked subscription takes it away, which is the one moment nothing is left that was paid for. An event we do not recognise changes nothing at all — new types are added by people who do not know what we do with them, and a default that moved a plan would eventually cancel an account nobody cancelled. The webhook is the only route here no session protects, because its caller has no account and never will. A signature over the raw body stands in for one, and it is checked before the body is looked at — a body that has been parsed and re-serialized is not the body that was signed. With no secret configured it refuses everything rather than accepting anything, since otherwise knowing the URL would be enough to set somebody's plan. Note also what is absent: no route sets a plan, so there is no endpoint for granting yourself a subscription. The product is written down as a definition with a script rather than clicked into a dashboard, because the two environments are separate servers and nothing made in one can be moved to the other. Promoting it is running the same script with the other token, which is the only version of that which cannot drift. It writes nothing without --apply and refuses to add a second product with a name already taken. |
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Wanjohi
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15631f5d25 |
feat(core,api): an organisation owns hardware, and a domain says who belongs
Two kinds of machine were modelled as one. A host somebody brings is theirs, reached through a team, and should die with their account. A host bought to serve other people's workloads is none of those things — and there was nowhere to put it, so it had to be registered under an employee's personal team, where it was that person's property and their account going away took it with them. Ownership becomes an either/or. A machine names a team or an organisation, exactly one, enforced by a check constraint rather than by convention: both null is a host nothing can bill, and both set is two answers to "whose is this?" where whichever join a query happens to take decides who pays. Hardware an organisation owns has no team and no person at all, which is the point. The organisation is deliberately not a billing subject and has no plan columns. It says who owns the metal; a team pays for what it uses either way. Membership is derived from a verified email domain rather than stored. An address is already the root identity, so a second record of who belongs where is a second answer that can disagree with the first — and deriving it means signing in with a personal address still gets an ordinary personal account, which is what lets one person hold a company account and use the consumer product. Nothing is granted on an unverified domain or an unverified address: either one is a string somebody typed. Entitlement on fleet hardware refuses everyone for now, with a reason that says so. What grants a run on metered hardware is a plan, and there is nothing to ask yet, so it fails closed rather than giving the expensive case away. The branch is written out so the plan check has one obvious place to land. Routes are read-only, and nothing seeds an organisation. Creating one grants membership to everyone who can receive mail at a domain, so it is an operator action against the database — a migration that inserted one would insert it into every deployment, including ones we have nothing to do with. See docs/deploy.md. |
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Wanjohi
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40b4270161 |
refactor(api)!: remove the shared operator secret, and let hosts sync their own
A single secret that turned any request into an operator was the only credential several routes accepted, and it had no caller left: the device pairing it existed for is on hold, and nothing in this tree or any client sent it. What remained was a key that bypassed authentication entirely, required to boot, and checked by nobody. Every route behind it had a better answer available: - Library and game sync move to host credentials. Both took a `userId` in the body, which meant one secret could write into anybody's library. A host now says which of its enrolled users a batch is for, and that claim is checked against the Steam sign-ins it actually holds — one box carries several people's accounts, so the pair is the unit. - Download-state reporting narrows to hosts alone, and the body that could name a different host is gone. Which host is reporting comes from its own credentials, and a body that still names one is refused rather than ignored. - Linking a Steam account is always for the caller. - Creating a game by hand is deleted; syncing already upserts the catalogue. - Reading the waitlist is deleted. Every address on it belongs to someone who has not agreed to anything, and answering it over HTTP made that list something a leaked key could drain. - The pairing-code routes are deleted with the flow they served. The domain module and its table stay, so returning to it is a route file rather than a migration. Nothing in the API now accepts a credential that stands for more than one caller: every request resolves to a specific user or a specific host, which is what lets a route say "the caller's own library" and mean it. BREAKING CHANGE: the `x-nestri-admin-token` header is no longer accepted and `ADMIN_SHARED_SECRET` is no longer read. `POST /games`, `GET /waitlist` and the `/pairing-code` routes are gone; `POST /games/sync` and `POST /library/sync` now require host credentials and take `userId` in the body; `POST /steam/link` no longer accepts `userId`; `POST /games/download-state` no longer accepts `hostId`. |
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Wanjohi
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6429ec4ff7 |
feat(api): record which host holds a Steam token for whom
A host that signs a person into Steam ends up holding a refresh token. The control plane needs to know that happened — to show it, and so a host that lost its disk can find out what it is expected to hold — but it must not know the credential, because the token is bound to the address that obtained it and a copy anywhere else is the account-theft signal Steam watches for. So `steam_enrolment` stores the outcome and has no token column, no encrypted token column, and no column that could hold one later. The safeguard is that the credential is never sent here at all; a nullable column would be the first step in undoing it, so a test asserts the column list exactly and fails if one appears. Three machine-authenticated routes go with it: report a completed sign-in, report that Steam refused the token, and list what this host should have. All three take the host from its own credentials, so a box can neither report onto nor read another box's hardware. Their bodies are strict, so a host that sends a token is told it is wrong rather than quietly believed — which also keeps the value out of the request log. The Steam id is deliberately not unique. One account signed in on two hosts is two rows and two tokens, and a unique index there would look like hygiene while refusing somebody their second box. There is no `pending` state: a sign-in challenge lives about two minutes inside one process, and nothing outside it needs to know it exists. Nothing revokes yet, and `last_ok_at` has no writer — a successful logon happens where there is no credential to report it with — so the column exists with the shape it will need and stays null rather than being filled with the nearest event that was easy to observe. |
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Wanjohi
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f30a1432f8 |
fix(deploy): require every credential, and give sandbox its own domain
Three things review caught, and one shape correction. **No credential has a default any more.** The compose file shipped `ADMIN_SHARED_SECRET` falling back to a value written in this repository — and that header bypasses token verification entirely, so anyone reading the file could act as an operator against any deployment that had not overridden it. A default is worth less than it looks here: the deployment that never set the variable is exactly the one where the default is public. Every credential now comes from `.env`, and compose refuses to start naming the variable it wanted. That also takes the last literal password out of a tracked file. **The origin ports are on loopback.** Both services speak plain HTTP and mark no cookie `Secure`, because both expect to sit behind something that terminates TLS. Published on every interface they were a way to reach the issuer around that proxy, with sign-in codes and tokens in clear text. **Mail settings are passed through rather than fixed.** The issuer was pinned to printing sign-in codes to its log, and the three delivery settings never reached it — so the documented way to configure mail could not work, and every code and recipient went to the container log instead. Printing codes is now asked for in `.env` like everything else, and with nothing configured the issuer refuses to send rather than logging. **Sandbox becomes a domain rather than a prefix.** `api.sandbox.nestri.io` and `auth.sandbox.nestri.io`, because sandbox holds whatever is not production and that set grows. One certificate for `*.sandbox.nestri.io` then covers all of it, including unpredictable per-pull-request names, and cannot be presented for production's own domain — which the zone-wide wildcard the previous shape leaned on could. Also drops `STEAM_API_KEY`. It was declared in two type definitions and read by nothing: linking an account makes no outbound call that needs it. |
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Wanjohi
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51ababc900 |
feat(deploy): drop the IaC layer, and make both apps runnable as containers
Moving the issuer's state into Postgres removed the last thing that tied either app to one hosting provider. What was left was a deployment tool describing resources that no longer existed — so this replaces it with `wrangler`, which is what actually deploys a Worker, and adds a second way to run each app that involves no provider at all. Each app now has a `wrangler.jsonc` with an environment per stage, and a `Dockerfile` beside it. The handler is the same one in both cases; what differs is only where its settings come from. Two of them gained a second spelling so that nothing has to branch on the runtime: Postgres arrives as a pooled binding or as `DATABASE_URL`, and the route to the issuer is a service binding or `AUTH_INTERNAL_URL`. That last one is new, and it is a split the binding was already making without saying so. `AUTH_ISSUER_URL` has to be the issuer's public name, because it is compared literally against every token's `iss` claim — but the public name is often not routable from inside a deployment. So the name and the route are two settings now rather than one that cannot be both. DNS moves out of code and into `docs/dns.md`, which lists every hostname and what it is for. Six records that change roughly never did not need a tool, and the table outlives whatever is answering the names — which is the point, since some of them will stop being Workers. The sandbox hostnames are hyphenated rather than nested for the same reason: a certificate covering `*.nestri.io` covers one label and not two, so `api-sandbox.nestri.io` can become an ordinary origin later without a certificate having to be ordered for it first. Also drops `EMAIL_DEV_LOG` from committed configuration into `.dev.vars`, which `wrangler deploy` cannot upload. Printing a live sign-in code to a log should not be one forgotten override away from production. |
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Wanjohi
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bbe729e5c7 |
feat(api): the session endpoint, and a claim that only one caller can win
A run of a box had core support and no HTTP surface. This adds both halves of it: a person asks for a run and reads it back, and the host agent the box is placed on is handed the work and reports what happened. The access rule is the point. An agent may only see or touch a run whose box is placed on its own hardware, and that is a `where` clause on every one of the three agent endpoints rather than a check next to them — host credentials are long-lived secrets sitting on hardware in somebody's home, so what one leaking can reach has to be decided by the query. "No such run" and "not your run" are the same refusal, so ids cannot be discovered by reporting states at them. `Session.setState` updated on the id alone, which means two agents polling the same work both succeed and both start the same box. There is one host today, which is exactly why that would have been built wrong and stayed wrong. The state a run is moving out of is now part of the `where` clause, so the database picks the winner; the loser gets a conflict rather than a silent no-op. Three cases that look alike are kept apart: re-reporting a state you already reported changes nothing and is not an error, a transition that does not exist is refused with the run left where it was, and another host reporting anything is forbidden. Asking for a run makes no decision about where it happens — a box already names its hardware, so the run inherits it by join. Placement therefore gets an interface at box creation, where the decision actually is, with the single-host case as its implementation and a deliberate refusal when there is more than one candidate and no policy to choose with. Tests cover the wire shape from both sides, the query scoping, the claim, and the timestamp idempotence a run's billing rests on. |
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 WanjohiandClaude Opus 5
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0143849129 |
feat: bring the control plane up to date
Squashes the current state of the internal working tree onto this history. The two trees had grown apart with no common ancestor, so this is a content sync rather than a merge, and the published history is preserved rather than rewritten — a force-push here would break every existing fork and clone to no benefit. What lands: - Waitlist: API route, core module, and migration 0006 alongside game aliases. - User verification. - CI, oxfmt config, editor settings. - Assorted fixes across the API routes and core modules. The repository's own README, the wordmark and the per-package READMEs are kept from this side; the internal tree had dropped them and they are what a stranger arriving here reads first. The marketing site in the internal tree is deliberately not here. It is a separate product with its own repo and its own licence, and this repo is the open one — a closed component does not belong in it regardless of how convenient the directory looked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Wanjohi
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3faac3008f | feat: Sync to OSS repo |