Get this thing going..
<!-- greptile_comment -->
<!-- greptile_summary -->
<h2><a
href="https://app.greptile.com/api/retrigger?id=63134761"><picture><source
media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)"
srcset="https://greptile-static-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/badges/RetriggerDark.svg?v=1"><source
media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)"
srcset="https://greptile-static-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/badges/Retrigger.svg?v=1"><img
alt="Retrigger"
src="https://greptile-static-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/badges/Retrigger.svg?v=1"
align="right"></picture></a>Confidence Score: 5/5</h2>
The PR appears safe to merge; all previous findings are resolved and the
latest readiness change introduces no established actionable regression.
<h3>Summary</h3>
- Establishes required guest filesystems, runtime directories, device
permissions, and service processes.
- Reports initialization and service deaths over the lifecycle channel.
- Supports launch, restart, and shutdown commands for a resident guest.
- Separates service and workload identities and configures per-launch
runtime environments.
- Removes the currently inactive nescope screenshot option and makes
capture-chain verification fail explicitly when compositor readback is
unavailable.
- Reworks the guest image around `nesinit` as PID 1 without a
distribution service manager.
<h3>Diagram</h3>
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant Host
participant Init as nesinit
participant FS as Guest filesystems
participant Services as Service stack
participant Workload
Init->>Host: Ready(protocol version)
Host->>Init: Boot(mount descriptors)
Init->>FS: Establish and mount shares
Init->>Services: Spawn services in order
Services-->>Init: Required sockets ready
Init->>Host: Initialized(service names)
Host->>Init: Launch(id, exec, on_exit)
Init->>Workload: Spawn with isolated UID/runtime
Init->>Host: Started(id)
Workload-->>Init: Exit status
Init->>Host: WorkloadExited(id, status)
Host->>Init: Launch / Restart / Shutdown
```
<sub>Reviews (4) · Last reviewed commit: ["fix(nesinit): readiness is a
socket
that..."](731d34df9d)</sub>
<!-- /greptile_comment -->
---------
Co-authored-by: DatCaptainHorse <DatCaptainHorse@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four findings from review, all of them real.
The relay's directory was mounted on the tree a session's shares live in. A
fresh tmpfs there hides every directory the image prepared underneath it: the
install, the user state, the work directory, and the mount point the log share
is attached to from fstab. A box would have come up with a socket and without
any of the places its workload looks for its files, and the exact-path check
could not notice, because what fstab mounts is a directory inside that tree
rather than the tree itself. It moves to /run, which is where a runtime socket
belongs, is a tmpfs already, and has nothing else mounted inside it.
It was also owned by this process and closed to everyone else, which stopped
the workload traversing it to reach the relay at all. The directory is now
readable and searchable, and still writable by nothing but this process, which
is what makes the socket in it unreplaceable; the socket itself is what the
workload is allowed to connect to. The permission belongs on the socket rather
than on the path.
The address served to a reader was built once at startup and served forever, so
a reader that polls for a better one could only ever get the first. An endpoint
does not know all of its own addresses when it binds: the first is the one that
works on the same network and fails from anywhere else. It is now rebuilt per
read, which is what makes polling for it worth doing.
And the address was taken from whoever held a path in a directory the workload
can write. Workload code could unlink the socket a service was listening on,
bind its own, and every read afterwards would hand the client an address of its
choosing -- a session given to somebody else rather than a session that fails.
The peer's credentials are now checked before a byte is read, from the kernel
rather than from anything the peer says about itself, and an address served by
the workload's own user is refused and said loudly.
That check is only worth something while the workload has a user of its own, so
the image grows one. Two users, and they must stay two: one runs the services
that ship in the image, the other is who a workload runs as. Sharing one does
not weaken the check, it makes every session fail it.
A workload running as root is every user at once and cannot be told apart from
anything; the check stands down there and says so at boot instead, because
refusing root would refuse whatever legitimately serves the address as well.
Also bumps tinyvec by a patch release. It does not build on this toolchain --
`vec` resolves to the module and not the macro -- which made every crate that
depends on an endpoint, including this one, unbuildable. Pre-existing and
nothing to do with this change; the lockfile said the same version before it.
The root arrives read-only and this process is PID 1, so until it mounts
them there is no /proc and nowhere in the filesystem to put a socket.
Nothing else in the guest is an init system, so nothing else was going to.
The symptom was three failures that look unrelated and share one cause. On
a real box the payload relay could not bind, with EROFS; whatever serves
the session's address could not bind either, the same way; and this process
could not make itself ineligible for the OOM killer, because /proc was not
there to write to. What the caller saw was a workload that ran and
published nothing, which is true and says nothing about why.
/proc is mounted first and unconditionally: finding out what an image
already mounted requires it, and it is therefore the one entry that cannot
be checked that way itself. Everything after it is skipped when it is
already present, so an image that does this properly is not mounted over.
Failures warn rather than abort. Refusing to boot would replace a session
that fails with a reason by a guest that never dialled out at all, and the
second is harder to diagnose from the outside.
The relay's directory is named by the module that owns the socket rather
than spelled again here, with a test tying the two together: a rename that
reached one and not the other would put the relay back exactly as it was.
