Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Wanjohi
6429ec4ff7 feat(api): record which host holds a Steam token for whom
A host that signs a person into Steam ends up holding a refresh token. The
control plane needs to know that happened — to show it, and so a host that
lost its disk can find out what it is expected to hold — but it must not know
the credential, because the token is bound to the address that obtained it and
a copy anywhere else is the account-theft signal Steam watches for.

So `steam_enrolment` stores the outcome and has no token column, no encrypted
token column, and no column that could hold one later. The safeguard is that
the credential is never sent here at all; a nullable column would be the first
step in undoing it, so a test asserts the column list exactly and fails if one
appears. Three machine-authenticated routes go with it: report a completed
sign-in, report that Steam refused the token, and list what this host should
have. All three take the host from its own credentials, so a box can neither
report onto nor read another box's hardware. Their bodies are strict, so a
host that sends a token is told it is wrong rather than quietly believed —
which also keeps the value out of the request log.

The Steam id is deliberately not unique. One account signed in on two hosts is
two rows and two tokens, and a unique index there would look like hygiene while
refusing somebody their second box.

There is no `pending` state: a sign-in challenge lives about two minutes inside
one process, and nothing outside it needs to know it exists. Nothing revokes
yet, and `last_ok_at` has no writer — a successful logon happens where there is
no credential to report it with — so the column exists with the shape it will
need and stays null rather than being filled with the nearest event that was
easy to observe.
2026-09-06 13:27:51 +03:00
Wanjohi
f30a1432f8 fix(deploy): require every credential, and give sandbox its own domain
Three things review caught, and one shape correction.

**No credential has a default any more.** The compose file shipped
`ADMIN_SHARED_SECRET` falling back to a value written in this repository —
and that header bypasses token verification entirely, so anyone reading
the file could act as an operator against any deployment that had not
overridden it. A default is worth less than it looks here: the deployment
that never set the variable is exactly the one where the default is public.
Every credential now comes from `.env`, and compose refuses to start naming
the variable it wanted. That also takes the last literal password out of a
tracked file.

**The origin ports are on loopback.** Both services speak plain HTTP and
mark no cookie `Secure`, because both expect to sit behind something that
terminates TLS. Published on every interface they were a way to reach the
issuer around that proxy, with sign-in codes and tokens in clear text.

**Mail settings are passed through rather than fixed.** The issuer was
pinned to printing sign-in codes to its log, and the three delivery
settings never reached it — so the documented way to configure mail could
not work, and every code and recipient went to the container log instead.
Printing codes is now asked for in `.env` like everything else, and with
nothing configured the issuer refuses to send rather than logging.

**Sandbox becomes a domain rather than a prefix.** `api.sandbox.nestri.io`
and `auth.sandbox.nestri.io`, because sandbox holds whatever is not
production and that set grows. One certificate for `*.sandbox.nestri.io`
then covers all of it, including unpredictable per-pull-request names,
and cannot be presented for production's own domain — which the zone-wide
wildcard the previous shape leaned on could.

Also drops `STEAM_API_KEY`. It was declared in two type definitions and
read by nothing: linking an account makes no outbound call that needs it.
2026-09-05 15:58:21 +03:00
Wanjohi
51ababc900 feat(deploy): drop the IaC layer, and make both apps runnable as containers
Moving the issuer's state into Postgres removed the last thing that tied
either app to one hosting provider. What was left was a deployment tool
describing resources that no longer existed — so this replaces it with
`wrangler`, which is what actually deploys a Worker, and adds a second way
to run each app that involves no provider at all.

Each app now has a `wrangler.jsonc` with an environment per stage, and a
`Dockerfile` beside it. The handler is the same one in both cases; what
differs is only where its settings come from. Two of them gained a second
spelling so that nothing has to branch on the runtime: Postgres arrives as
a pooled binding or as `DATABASE_URL`, and the route to the issuer is a
service binding or `AUTH_INTERNAL_URL`.

That last one is new, and it is a split the binding was already making
without saying so. `AUTH_ISSUER_URL` has to be the issuer's public name,
because it is compared literally against every token's `iss` claim — but
the public name is often not routable from inside a deployment. So the
name and the route are two settings now rather than one that cannot be
both.

DNS moves out of code and into `docs/dns.md`, which lists every hostname
and what it is for. Six records that change roughly never did not need a
tool, and the table outlives whatever is answering the names — which is
the point, since some of them will stop being Workers. The sandbox
hostnames are hyphenated rather than nested for the same reason: a
certificate covering `*.nestri.io` covers one label and not two, so
`api-sandbox.nestri.io` can become an ordinary origin later without a
certificate having to be ordered for it first.

Also drops `EMAIL_DEV_LOG` from committed configuration into `.dev.vars`,
which `wrangler deploy` cannot upload. Printing a live sign-in code to a
log should not be one forgotten override away from production.
2026-09-05 15:27:56 +03:00
Wanjohi
bbe729e5c7 feat(api): the session endpoint, and a claim that only one caller can win
A run of a box had core support and no HTTP surface. This adds both halves
of it: a person asks for a run and reads it back, and the host agent the box
is placed on is handed the work and reports what happened.

The access rule is the point. An agent may only see or touch a run whose box
is placed on its own hardware, and that is a `where` clause on every one of
the three agent endpoints rather than a check next to them — host credentials
are long-lived secrets sitting on hardware in somebody's home, so what one
leaking can reach has to be decided by the query. "No such run" and "not your
run" are the same refusal, so ids cannot be discovered by reporting states
at them.

`Session.setState` updated on the id alone, which means two agents polling
the same work both succeed and both start the same box. There is one host
today, which is exactly why that would have been built wrong and stayed
wrong. The state a run is moving out of is now part of the `where` clause,
so the database picks the winner; the loser gets a conflict rather than a
silent no-op. Three cases that look alike are kept apart: re-reporting a
state you already reported changes nothing and is not an error, a transition
that does not exist is refused with the run left where it was, and another
host reporting anything is forbidden.

Asking for a run makes no decision about where it happens — a box already
names its hardware, so the run inherits it by join. Placement therefore
gets an interface at box creation, where the decision actually is, with the
single-host case as its implementation and a deliberate refusal when there
is more than one candidate and no policy to choose with.

Tests cover the wire shape from both sides, the query scoping, the claim,
and the timestamp idempotence a run's billing rests on.
2026-09-04 18:57:08 +03:00
Wanjohi
0143849129 feat: bring the control plane up to date
Squashes the current state of the internal working tree onto this history.
The two trees had grown apart with no common ancestor, so this is a content
sync rather than a merge, and the published history is preserved rather than
rewritten — a force-push here would break every existing fork and clone to no
benefit.

What lands:

- Waitlist: API route, core module, and migration 0006 alongside game aliases.
- User verification.
- CI, oxfmt config, editor settings.
- Assorted fixes across the API routes and core modules.

The repository's own README, the wordmark and the per-package READMEs are kept
from this side; the internal tree had dropped them and they are what a stranger
arriving here reads first.

The marketing site in the internal tree is deliberately not here. It is a
separate product with its own repo and its own licence, and this repo is the
open one — a closed component does not belong in it regardless of how convenient
the directory looked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 17:48:46 +03:00
Wanjohi
3faac3008f feat: Sync to OSS repo 2026-08-06 22:13:51 +03:00