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A single secret that turned any request into an operator was the only credential several routes accepted, and it had no caller left: the device pairing it existed for is on hold, and nothing in this tree or any client sent it. What remained was a key that bypassed authentication entirely, required to boot, and checked by nobody. Every route behind it had a better answer available: - Library and game sync move to host credentials. Both took a `userId` in the body, which meant one secret could write into anybody's library. A host now says which of its enrolled users a batch is for, and that claim is checked against the Steam sign-ins it actually holds — one box carries several people's accounts, so the pair is the unit. - Download-state reporting narrows to hosts alone, and the body that could name a different host is gone. Which host is reporting comes from its own credentials, and a body that still names one is refused rather than ignored. - Linking a Steam account is always for the caller. - Creating a game by hand is deleted; syncing already upserts the catalogue. - Reading the waitlist is deleted. Every address on it belongs to someone who has not agreed to anything, and answering it over HTTP made that list something a leaked key could drain. - The pairing-code routes are deleted with the flow they served. The domain module and its table stay, so returning to it is a route file rather than a migration. Nothing in the API now accepts a credential that stands for more than one caller: every request resolves to a specific user or a specific host, which is what lets a route say "the caller's own library" and mean it. BREAKING CHANGE: the `x-nestri-admin-token` header is no longer accepted and `ADMIN_SHARED_SECRET` is no longer read. `POST /games`, `GET /waitlist` and the `/pairing-code` routes are gone; `POST /games/sync` and `POST /library/sync` now require host credentials and take `userId` in the body; `POST /steam/link` no longer accepts `userId`; `POST /games/download-state` no longer accepts `hostId`.
261 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript
261 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { createClient } from '@nestri/auth/client';
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import { AccessToken } from '@nestri/core/access-token/index';
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import { Actor } from '@nestri/core/actor';
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import { subjects } from '@nestri/core/auth/subjects';
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import { Env } from '@nestri/core/env';
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import { ErrorCodes, VisibleError } from '@nestri/core/error';
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import { Machine } from '@nestri/core/machine/index';
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import { Member } from '@nestri/core/team/member';
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import type { MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
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/**
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* Reaches the issuer, over a binding where the platform offers one.
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*
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* A binding routes by binding rather than by hostname, which saves a trip out
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* to the internet and back for a call this middleware makes on nearly every
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* request. The host in the URL is then arbitrary — but `new Request` still
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* demands an absolute URL, and stripping down to a bare path threw
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* `Invalid URL` before the token was even looked at.
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*
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* Where there is no such binding the issuer is an ordinary HTTP origin at
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* `AUTH_ISSUER_URL` and plain `fetch` is the whole of it. Nothing else here
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* changes, because the URL being fetched is the same one either way.
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*/
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function issuerFetch(env: Record<string, unknown>, issuer: string) {
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const binding = env?.AUTH as { fetch: typeof fetch } | undefined;
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if (typeof binding?.fetch === 'function') {
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return (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
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const url = asUrl(input);
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return binding.fetch(new Request(url, init));
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};
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}
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// The same split the binding makes, spelled out: `AUTH_INTERNAL_URL` is
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// the route and `issuer` stays the name. The client builds its URLs from
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// the name, so the swap happens here, on the way out, and every claim
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// checked afterwards is still checked against the name.
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const internal = Env.get().AUTH_INTERNAL_URL?.replace(/\/+$/, '');
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if (!internal || internal === issuer) {
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return (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => fetch(asUrl(input), init);
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}
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return (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
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const url = asUrl(input);
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return fetch(url.startsWith(issuer) ? internal + url.slice(issuer.length) : url, init);
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};
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}
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function asUrl(input: RequestInfo | URL): string {
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return typeof input === 'string' ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.href : input.url;
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}
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/**
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* The issuer must be its **public** URL.
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*
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* `verify` checks a token's `iss` claim against the issuer the client was
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* built with, and the issuer derives what it advertises from the URL it was
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* reached on. Tokens are minted through the public URL, so they carry it. A
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* placeholder like `https://auth.internal` addresses a binding perfectly well
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* — the hostname is ignored there — and then disagrees with every real token.
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* Discovery through the binding does not help: it answers with the placeholder
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* too, because that is the host it was asked on.
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*
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* The failure is silent by nature. A rejected claim is reported as `err`,
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* which is indistinguishable from an expired or forged token, so the whole
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* bearer path returns 401 and looks like ordinary auth working correctly.
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* Hence the explicit throw rather than a fallback: a misconfiguration here
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* takes down every user session, and it should say so.
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*/
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function getClient(env: Record<string, unknown>) {
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const configured = Env.get().AUTH_ISSUER_URL;
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if (!configured) {
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throw new Error(
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'AUTH_ISSUER_URL is not configured; every bearer token would be rejected as unsigned'
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);
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}
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// The trailing slash matters twice, and both failures are quiet. It is
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// appended to build the discovery URL, where `…:1337//.well-known/…` is a
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// 404; and it is compared literally against the `iss` claim, which carries
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// no trailing slash. A worker URL from the platform arrives with one.
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const issuer = configured.replace(/\/+$/, '');
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return createClient({
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issuer,
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clientID: 'api',
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fetch: issuerFetch(env, issuer)
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});
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}
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export const auth: MiddlewareHandler = async (c, next) => {
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// A registered nessh host proves it is itself, rather than asserting an id
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// nobody checks. Wrong credentials fall through to public rather than
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// erroring, so probing tells an attacker nothing about which ids exist.
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const machineId = c.req.header('x-nestri-machine-id');
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const machineSecret = c.req.header('x-nestri-machine-secret');
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if (machineId && machineSecret) {
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const machine = await Machine.authenticate({ id: machineId, secret: machineSecret });
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if (machine) {
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await Machine.touchLastSeen({ id: machine.id });
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return Actor.with(
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{
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type: 'machine',
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properties: {
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machineID: machine.id,
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ownerUserID: machine.ownerUserId,
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teamID: machine.teamId
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}
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},
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next
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);
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}
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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}
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const authHeader = c.req.header('authorization');
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if (!authHeader) {
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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}
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const match = authHeader.match(/^Bearer (.+)$/);
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if (!match) {
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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}
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const token = match[1];
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// A personal access token is resolved from the database, never through JWT
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// verification. The prefix decides which, so a PAT does not pay for a
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// well-known lookup and a JWT does not pay for a query.
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if (AccessToken.looksLikeToken(token)) {
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const pat = await AccessToken.authenticate(token);
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if (!pat) {
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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}
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await AccessToken.touchLastUsed(pat.id);
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if (pat.teamId) {
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// The team grant is re-checked against live membership rather than
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// trusted from the row, so someone removed from a team loses what
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// their old token carried without anyone remembering to revoke it.
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const membership = await Member.findByTeamAndUser({
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teamId: pat.teamId,
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userId: pat.ownerUserId
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});
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if (!membership) {
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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}
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return Actor.with(
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{
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type: 'member',
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properties: {
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userID: pat.ownerUserId,
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role: membership.role,
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teamID: pat.teamId
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}
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},
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next
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);
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}
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return Actor.with(
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{
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type: 'user',
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properties: {
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userID: pat.ownerUserId,
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// A PAT is tied to neither a Steam account nor a device, so
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// it carries neither. A route needing those must read them
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// from the user rather than assume the caller came by SSH.
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linkedAccountID: '',
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fingerprint: undefined
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}
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},
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next
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);
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}
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// A token that cannot be verified — malformed, expired, or because the
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// auth service is unreachable — makes the caller unauthenticated, not the
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// request a server fault. `verify` reports the first two in `err` and
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// *throws* the third, and an uncaught throw turned a bad token into a 500.
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let verified;
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try {
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verified = await getClient(c.env).verify(subjects, token);
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} catch (error) {
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
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console.error('token verification failed:', error);
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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}
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if (verified.err) {
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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}
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const { subject } = verified;
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if (subject.type === 'user') {
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const teamID = c.req.header('x-nestri-team');
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if (teamID) {
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const membership = await Member.findByTeamAndUser({
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teamId: teamID,
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userId: subject.properties.userID
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});
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if (membership) {
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return Actor.with(
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{
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type: 'member',
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properties: {
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userID: subject.properties.userID,
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role: membership.role,
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teamID
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}
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},
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next
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);
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}
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}
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return Actor.with(
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{
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type: 'user',
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properties: {
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userID: subject.properties.userID,
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linkedAccountID: subject.properties.linkedAccountID,
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fingerprint: subject.properties.fingerprint
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}
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},
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next
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);
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}
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return Actor.with({ type: 'public', properties: {} }, next);
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};
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/**
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* Requires an authenticated caller of any kind, machines included.
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*
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* It deliberately does *not* single machines out: `/games` applies this to the
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* whole group, and download-state — the one route a box exists to call — sits
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* inside it. What stops a box from acting as its owner is `Actor.userID`,
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* which refuses a machine outright, so a route written for a human cannot
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* silently accept a box no matter which guard it sits behind.
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*/
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export const notPublic: MiddlewareHandler = async (_, next) => {
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const actor = Actor.use();
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if (actor.type === 'public') {
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throw new VisibleError(
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'authentication',
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ErrorCodes.Authentication.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'Missing authorization header'
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);
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}
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return next();
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};
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/** Requires credentials belonging to a registered nessh host. */
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export const machineOnly: MiddlewareHandler = async (_, next) => {
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const actor = Actor.use();
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if (actor.type !== 'machine') {
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throw new VisibleError(
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'forbidden',
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ErrorCodes.Permission.INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS,
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'Machine credentials required'
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);
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}
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return next();
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};
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