7b99f49f62
Builds on the previous change, which had PID 1, the channel and the trait but mounted nothing. The shares are mounted now: a tag names an export, the descriptor names where it lands, and every share goes on nosuid and nodev whether or not it is writable — a share is data handed to the guest, and no descriptor has a way to ask for a setuid binary or a device node in one. Mounting needs privileges a test does not have, so the arguments and flags are derived by a function the tests can assert, which is where the read-only decision lives. Progress is reported in two messages rather than one. A share that did not mount and a command that did not run are not the same incident, and each carries the reason the operating system gave and the path it happened on: a permission error on a named directory can be acted on, where "the share did not mount" cannot. The second layer is relayed and never read. Bytes arrive on the channel in an envelope, cross a unix socket to the workload, and come back the same way. The body is a string rather than nested JSON on purpose: a document this component can index into is a document it can grow to depend on, and then the layer is no longer opaque and the boundary it exists to draw is gone. An envelope is never logged — not the body, not truncated, not at debug level — and the channel name with a byte count is the whole of what may be said about one. The type's Debug is written by hand for the same reason, because a derived one puts the body one careless format string away from a log line. A write to a channel nobody is reading now ends the session the same way a closed read does. A caller that has stopped listening has also stopped being able to say stop, which is one situation and was two outcomes. The guest listens on the relay socket and the workload dials in, which is the convention the other guest sockets already use and removes the startup ordering problem: a workload that is not running yet has simply not connected yet.
5.6 KiB
nesinit
PID 1 inside a box.
A microVM has no init unless something is it. Three of the jobs are nobody else's, and this is all of them:
- Reaping. A process whose parent dies is reparented to PID 1. Without a reaper, every orphan the workload leaves behind holds a pid and a slot in the process table until the guest is gone.
- Ordered shutdown. The workload stops first and alone, then everything else, then the disks are flushed and the machine is powered off. An init that returns leaves a guest running with nothing in it.
- The guest end of the control channel. One vsock connection out, carrying what to run in and what happened back.
It does not know what it is running. It is handed a command line, a set of shares and what an exit means; there is no code path here that branches on which workload it started, and there is not meant to be.
The channel
The guest dials out on a fixed vsock port and speaks first:
guest → { "type": "ready", "protocol_version": 2 }
guest ← { "type": "boot", "exec": {...}, "mounts": [...], "geometry": {...}, "on_exit": {...} }
guest → { "type": "mounted" }
guest → { "type": "started" }
guest → { "type": "workload_exited", "exit_code": 0 }
Newline-delimited JSON. Dialling out rather than being connected to is worth keeping for two reasons: the listener is up before the VM starts, so nothing races a booting kernel and nothing has to retry, and the connection establishing is itself the liveness signal — without it the far end needs a timeout to tell a slow boot from a dead one.
The version goes out before anything is read, so a peer that cannot talk to this build refuses it before handing over a descriptor rather than failing later on a field that turned out to be missing.
The types are in nesprotocol::lifecycle,
behind the lifecycle feature, so both ends of the channel read one definition
and neither can drift from it silently.
mounted / mount_failed stay separate from started / start_failed
because the two want different things looked at: a share that did not appear
and a command that did not run are not the same incident. A failure carries the
reason in the words the operating system used, and the path it happened on — a
permission error on a named directory can be acted on, where "the share did not
mount" cannot.
Two layers, one channel
The channel carries a lifecycle layer, above, and a payload layer that nesinit relays and never reads:
{ "type": "payload", "channel": "<name>", "body": "<opaque string>" }
Both directions. Inside the guest an envelope crosses a unix socket at
/nestri/payload.sock, which the guest listens on and the workload dials into.
That socket is a mechanism and expected to change; the envelope is the boundary
and is not.
body is a string rather than nested JSON, deliberately. A document nesinit
can index into is a document nesinit can grow to depend on, and then the layer
is no longer opaque and the boundary it exists to draw is gone.
An envelope is never logged. Not the body, not truncated, not at debug
level. The channel name and the byte count are the whole of what may be said
about one — what crosses here includes credentials meant for the workload and
nothing else. Payload's Debug is written by hand for the same reason: a
derived one puts the body one careless {:?} away from a log line.
The shares
Each mounts entry is a tag, a path to put it at, and whether it is read-only.
The tag names an export and is never a path on the other side of the channel,
so the guest learns nothing about the filesystem it is handed a piece of.
Choosing where a share lands is the descriptor's job, not the guest's:
deciding that means knowing what the workload expects to find there, which is
exactly the knowledge a workload-independent init does not have.
Every share is mounted nosuid and nodev, whether or not it is writable. A
share is data handed to the guest, and no descriptor has a way to ask for a
setuid binary or a device node in one.
uid and gid in exec are load-bearing rather than hygiene. Whoever writes
the descriptor also exported the writable share, so the two have to agree; when
they do not, the first write is refused and the failure surfaces here as a
permission error with a path, instead of as a workload that misbehaves much
later for no visible reason.
It reports; it does not supervise
When the workload ends, the exit goes up the channel and the session is over.
on_exit says what that exit means — whether it ends the session — and
nothing here restarts anything. Starting something again is a decision for the
end that can see whether restarting is repair or a loop.
A signalled workload is reported as signalled, with no exit code. Reporting
0 for a killed process would make a kill look like a clean run.
What is not here yet
geometry is carried and parsed but nothing consumes it: nesinit does not
start the guest's own services yet. ticket exists as a message with no
producer wired to it.
Testing
cargo test -p nesinit
No VM required, and that is the point of the seams. Reaping is tested against
real forked children — PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER makes a test process inherit
orphans the same way PID 1 does. The channel is tested over an in-memory pipe,
because the transport contributes nothing to the protocol beyond ordering and
framing. The relay is tested over a real unix socket. Mounting needs
privileges a test does not have, so what is asserted is the arguments and flags
the mount is given, which is where the read-only and nosuid decisions live.