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Four findings from review, all of them real. The relay's directory was mounted on the tree a session's shares live in. A fresh tmpfs there hides every directory the image prepared underneath it: the install, the user state, the work directory, and the mount point the log share is attached to from fstab. A box would have come up with a socket and without any of the places its workload looks for its files, and the exact-path check could not notice, because what fstab mounts is a directory inside that tree rather than the tree itself. It moves to /run, which is where a runtime socket belongs, is a tmpfs already, and has nothing else mounted inside it. It was also owned by this process and closed to everyone else, which stopped the workload traversing it to reach the relay at all. The directory is now readable and searchable, and still writable by nothing but this process, which is what makes the socket in it unreplaceable; the socket itself is what the workload is allowed to connect to. The permission belongs on the socket rather than on the path. The address served to a reader was built once at startup and served forever, so a reader that polls for a better one could only ever get the first. An endpoint does not know all of its own addresses when it binds: the first is the one that works on the same network and fails from anywhere else. It is now rebuilt per read, which is what makes polling for it worth doing. And the address was taken from whoever held a path in a directory the workload can write. Workload code could unlink the socket a service was listening on, bind its own, and every read afterwards would hand the client an address of its choosing -- a session given to somebody else rather than a session that fails. The peer's credentials are now checked before a byte is read, from the kernel rather than from anything the peer says about itself, and an address served by the workload's own user is refused and said loudly. That check is only worth something while the workload has a user of its own, so the image grows one. Two users, and they must stay two: one runs the services that ship in the image, the other is who a workload runs as. Sharing one does not weaken the check, it makes every session fail it. A workload running as root is every user at once and cannot be told apart from anything; the check stands down there and says so at boot instead, because refusing root would refuse whatever legitimately serves the address as well. Also bumps tinyvec by a patch release. It does not build on this toolchain -- `vec` resolves to the module and not the macro -- which made every crate that depends on an endpoint, including this one, unbuildable. Pre-existing and nothing to do with this change; the lockfile said the same version before it.
240 lines
8.7 KiB
Rust
240 lines
8.7 KiB
Rust
// nesinit: PID 1 inside a box.
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//
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// Three jobs, in the order they matter: reap what the workload orphans, run
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// the workload the channel describes, and turn the end of either into an
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// ordered shutdown.
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use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
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use std::time::Duration;
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use nesinit::payload::{self, Ports};
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use nesinit::reap::{self, Waiters};
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use nesinit::session::{self, Outcome};
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use nesinit::shutdown::{self, Machine};
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use nesinit::ticket;
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use nesinit::workload::{Process, Workload};
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use nesprotocol::lifecycle::CONTROL_PORT;
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use tokio::signal::unix::{SignalKind, signal};
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use tokio_vsock::{VMADDR_CID_HOST, VsockAddr, VsockStream};
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/// How long a process gets between being asked to stop and being made to.
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const GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
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/// How many envelopes may be in flight in one direction.
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///
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/// Small on purpose: what crosses this layer is re-sent when it changes, so a
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/// deep queue holds stale copies of it rather than protecting anything.
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const RELAY_DEPTH: usize = 8;
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/// How many addresses may be waiting to be forwarded.
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///
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/// Two, because only the newest one matters: an address is superseded by the
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/// next one rather than added to, so a deeper queue holds stale copies of it
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/// and delays the one that is current.
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const ADDRESS_DEPTH: usize = 2;
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fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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tracing_subscriber::fmt()
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.with_env_filter(
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tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| "info".into()),
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)
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.init();
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// Before everything, including the two below: the root is read-only and
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// nothing else in this guest is an init system, so until this runs there
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// is no `/proc` to score this process in and nowhere to put a socket.
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nesinit::filesystems::establish();
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// Both before anything is started, so nothing can be orphaned or scored
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// in the window where neither is true yet.
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if let Err(error) = reap::become_subreaper() {
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tracing::warn!(%error, "orphans may not be reaped by this process");
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}
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if let Err(error) = reap::refuse_oom_kill() {
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// Not fatal: outside a guest there may be no procfs to write to, and
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// refusing to boot over it would be worse than the risk.
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tracing::warn!(%error, "init is eligible for the OOM killer");
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}
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let pid = std::process::id();
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if pid != 1 {
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tracing::warn!(pid, "not PID 1: the kernel will reparent orphans elsewhere");
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}
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let waiters = Waiters::new();
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let mut workload = Process::new(waiters.clone());
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let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread()
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.enable_all()
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.build()?;
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let outcome = runtime.block_on(guest(&waiters, &mut workload));
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match &outcome {
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Ok(outcome) => tracing::info!(?outcome, "the session ended"),
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Err(error) => tracing::error!(%error, "the session failed"),
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}
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// Before anything below waits on a pid: the reaper runs on this runtime's
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// threads, and two things calling `wait` is what the registry exists to
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// prevent.
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drop(runtime);
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// Reached however the session ended, including an error: an init that
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// returns leaves the guest running with nothing in it.
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let mut machine = Guest { workload };
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shutdown::ordered(&mut machine, GRACE);
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unreachable!("power_off does not return");
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}
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async fn guest(waiters: &Waiters, workload: &mut Process) -> anyhow::Result<Outcome> {
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// Reaping runs for as long as the guest does. A workload that leaks
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// orphans leaks them while it is running, not when it stops.
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tokio::spawn(reaper(waiters.clone()));
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let address = VsockAddr::new(VMADDR_CID_HOST, CONTROL_PORT);
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// Dialled once, with no retry: the far end is listening before this
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// machine exists, so a refused connection means something is wrong that
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// waiting will not fix.
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let channel = VsockStream::connect(address).await?;
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// The relay is up before the workload is started, so a workload that
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// dials in as its first act finds it there.
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let (down_tx, down_rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(RELAY_DEPTH);
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let (up_tx, up_rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(RELAY_DEPTH);
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tokio::spawn(async move {
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if let Err(error) = payload::serve(Path::new(payload::SOCKET), down_rx, up_tx).await {
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tracing::error!(%error, "the relay is not running");
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}
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});
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let mut ports = Ports {
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to_workload: down_tx,
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from_workload: up_rx,
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};
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// Started before the workload, like the relay, and for the same reason:
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// whatever serves the address may bind the moment it comes up, and nothing
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// here should be the reason a session waits to be reachable.
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let (found_tx, mut found_rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(ADDRESS_DEPTH);
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// Which user the carrier must not accept an address from. Empty until the
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// descriptor names it, which is also when the workload that could abuse it
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// is started -- so there is nothing to refuse before it is filled in.
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let untrusted = ticket::Untrusted::unknown();
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tokio::spawn(ticket::carry(
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PathBuf::from(ticket::SOCKET),
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found_tx,
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untrusted.clone(),
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));
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let outcome = tokio::select! {
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outcome = session::run(channel, workload, &mut ports, &mut found_rx, &untrusted) => outcome?,
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signal = asked_to_stop() => {
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signal?;
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tracing::info!("asked to stop");
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Outcome::Shutdown
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}
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};
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Ok(outcome)
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}
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/// Drain exited children whenever the kernel says there are some, and hand
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/// each exit to whoever is waiting for it.
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async fn reaper(waiters: Waiters) {
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let mut children = match signal(SignalKind::child()) {
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Ok(children) => children,
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Err(error) => {
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tracing::error!(%error, "orphans will not be reaped");
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return;
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}
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};
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loop {
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children.recv().await;
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for (pid, exit) in reap::reap_exited() {
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if !waiters.deliver(pid, exit) {
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// An orphan nothing asked about, which is most of them.
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tracing::debug!(pid, ?exit, "reaped");
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/// A signal from outside the channel. In a guest this is the hypervisor's
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/// shutdown request.
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async fn asked_to_stop() -> std::io::Result<()> {
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let mut term = signal(SignalKind::terminate())?;
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let mut int = signal(SignalKind::interrupt())?;
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tokio::select! {
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_ = term.recv() => Ok(()),
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_ = int.recv() => Ok(()),
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}
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}
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/// The machine, for real.
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struct Guest {
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workload: Process,
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}
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impl Machine for Guest {
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fn signal_workload(&mut self) {
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self.workload.signal_stop();
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}
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fn await_workload(&mut self, grace: Duration) -> bool {
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// The session already reported the exit if there was one; this is the
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// window for a workload that was asked to stop on the way down. It
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// waits for that pid and no other, or the first service to leave would
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// look like the workload leaving.
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self.workload.await_exit(grace)
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}
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fn kill_workload(&mut self) {
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// The workload alone. Everything else in the guest is still expected
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// to get the ordered stop below, and a kill to every process here
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// would take the services with it.
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self.workload.signal(libc::SIGKILL);
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self.workload.await_exit(Duration::from_secs(1));
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}
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fn signal_rest(&mut self, grace: Duration) {
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// -1 is every process this one may signal, which as PID 1 is all of
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// them but itself. The workload has already stopped by here.
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unsafe { libc::kill(-1, libc::SIGTERM) };
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wait_for_quiet(grace);
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}
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fn kill_rest(&mut self) {
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unsafe { libc::kill(-1, libc::SIGKILL) };
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wait_for_quiet(Duration::from_secs(1));
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}
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fn flush_disks(&mut self) {
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unsafe { libc::sync() };
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}
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fn power_off(&mut self) {
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// SAFETY: reboot is the only way out of a guest whose init is done.
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unsafe { libc::reboot(libc::RB_POWER_OFF) };
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// Reached only if the guest refused to power off, which no caller can
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// be told about — the channel is gone by now.
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std::process::exit(0);
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}
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}
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/// Reap until nothing is left or the deadline passes.
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fn wait_for_quiet(grace: Duration) -> bool {
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let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + grace;
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loop {
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let mut status: libc::c_int = 0;
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// Blocking on purpose: this runs after the runtime has stopped, so
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// there is nothing left to keep responsive.
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let pid = unsafe { libc::waitpid(-1, &mut status, libc::WNOHANG) };
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if pid == -1 {
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return true; // ECHILD: nothing left to wait for
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}
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if std::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
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return false;
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}
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if pid == 0 {
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std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
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}
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}
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}
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