Reissue internally revokes the old cert (revoke_issued), which makes
the published CRL immediately stale, but neither the CLI --reissue
path nor the TUI renew flow ever regenerated/copied it — only
standalone revoke and "Regenerate CRL" did. A cert revoked as part of
a reissue could keep authenticating against OpenVPN until someone
remembered to regenerate the CRL by hand.
Both reissue paths now call gen_crl()+copy_crl() right after a
successful revoke_issued(), same as standalone revoke. This isn't
gated on the subsequent build_client_full() succeeding, since the CRL
is already stale the moment the old cert is revoked. A CRL-regen
failure here is reported as a warning and the reissue continues to
build the replacement cert — a new cert is more urgent than a fresh
CRL, and "Regenerate CRL"/--gen-crl remain available to retry.
Also add a RESTORECON_BINARY setting (default "restorecon", "" to
disable): copy_crl() now runs it on the destination file after every
copy, everywhere copy_crl() is called. Best-effort like
is_ca_key_encrypted() — a missing/misconfigured binary is swallowed
rather than breaking CRL deployment on non-SELinux systems.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
curses.use_default_colors() raises on terminals (e.g. serial consoles
using TERM=linux/vt100) whose terminfo lacks default-color support;
init_colors() now falls back to an explicit black background and caps
the "disabled" color to 8-color terminals.
--reissue without --email silently sent no mail when the CN wasn't in
openvpncertupdate-metadata.json, even though its email was already
embedded in the cert's index.txt subject (via EASYRSA_REQ_EMAIL) and
the TUI already fell back to it. Since build_client_full() always
writes that subject field whenever an email is known, metadata.json
was a redundant, driftable copy — remove it and have get_email() read
index.txt directly, picking the last non-revoked entry for a CN since
index.txt can contain revoked/duplicate lines for the same CN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cryptgeon's real protocol (verified against upstream occulto/frontend/backend
source) never matched what create_note() sent: it used a SHA-256-derived key
instead of the raw one, a single-blob ciphertext instead of the delimited
AES-GCM--nonce--ciphertext format, an empty meta field instead of a JSON
string, and a hash-bang URL instead of the real /note/<id>#<key> route -
notes uploaded fine but were undecryptable in the browser.
Also adds CA_PASSPHRASE auto-detection/prompting ("" auto-detects an
encrypted CA key and prompts, "!empty"/"!ask" opt out of/force the prompt)
and an external .conf file (--config / CONFIG_PATH / <script>.conf) that can
override the SETTINGS block without editing the script.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
