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fix(nesinit): do not mount over the share tree, and check who serves an address

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Four findings from review, all of them real.

The relay's directory was mounted on the tree a session's shares live in. A
fresh tmpfs there hides every directory the image prepared underneath it: the
install, the user state, the work directory, and the mount point the log share
is attached to from fstab. A box would have come up with a socket and without
any of the places its workload looks for its files, and the exact-path check
could not notice, because what fstab mounts is a directory inside that tree
rather than the tree itself. It moves to /run, which is where a runtime socket
belongs, is a tmpfs already, and has nothing else mounted inside it.

It was also owned by this process and closed to everyone else, which stopped
the workload traversing it to reach the relay at all. The directory is now
readable and searchable, and still writable by nothing but this process, which
is what makes the socket in it unreplaceable; the socket itself is what the
workload is allowed to connect to. The permission belongs on the socket rather
than on the path.

The address served to a reader was built once at startup and served forever, so
a reader that polls for a better one could only ever get the first. An endpoint
does not know all of its own addresses when it binds: the first is the one that
works on the same network and fails from anywhere else. It is now rebuilt per
read, which is what makes polling for it worth doing.

And the address was taken from whoever held a path in a directory the workload
can write. Workload code could unlink the socket a service was listening on,
bind its own, and every read afterwards would hand the client an address of its
choosing -- a session given to somebody else rather than a session that fails.
The peer's credentials are now checked before a byte is read, from the kernel
rather than from anything the peer says about itself, and an address served by
the workload's own user is refused and said loudly.

That check is only worth something while the workload has a user of its own, so
the image grows one. Two users, and they must stay two: one runs the services
that ship in the image, the other is who a workload runs as. Sharing one does
not weaken the check, it makes every session fail it.

A workload running as root is every user at once and cannot be told apart from
anything; the check stands down there and says so at boot instead, because
refusing root would refuse whatever legitimately serves the address as well.

Also bumps tinyvec by a patch release. It does not build on this toolchain --
`vec` resolves to the module and not the macro -- which made every crate that
depends on an endpoint, including this one, unbuildable. Pre-existing and
nothing to do with this change; the lockfile said the same version before it.
This commit is contained in:
Wanjohi
2026-09-06 18:20:30 +03:00
parent 00a2bdab30
commit f74de9beb8
9 changed files with 460 additions and 66 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -4214,9 +4214,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "tinyvec"
version = "1.13.0"
version = "1.13.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0ba2077be5cd93c7408c849e45a4ab261b59f923f4bcdee2a724b8ed5a175a77"
checksum = "4cf0ded5c4e56918d8f8a339e1bb67d038d3bc6d144ac407904015ba2e4cde9b"
dependencies = [
"tinyvec_macros",
]

22
apps/neshub/src/ipc_listener.rs
View File

@@ -292,7 +292,24 @@ pub async fn run_stats_ipc_listener(
tracing::info!("stats IPC listener exited");
}
pub async fn run_ticket_ipc_listener(socket_path: PathBuf, ticket: crate::NestriTicket) {
/// Serve the address a client needs, rebuilt on every read.
///
/// **The ticket is built per connection and not once at startup.** An endpoint
/// does not know all of its own addresses when it binds: a direct one is there
/// immediately, and a relayed or hole-punched one becomes known seconds later.
/// A ticket captured once therefore carries only the address that was available
/// first, which is the one that works on the same network and fails from
/// anywhere else — and whoever reads this polls precisely so that a better
/// answer can replace it. Serving a snapshot made that polling pointless: every
/// read returned the same local-only address forever.
///
/// The stream name is generated once and kept, because it identifies this
/// session rather than describing how to reach it. Only the addresses change.
pub async fn run_ticket_ipc_listener(
socket_path: PathBuf,
endpoint: iroh::Endpoint,
stream_name: String,
) {
if socket_path.exists() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&socket_path);
}
@@ -319,6 +336,9 @@ pub async fn run_ticket_ipc_listener(socket_path: PathBuf, ticket: crate::Nestri
loop {
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((mut stream, _)) => {
// Asked of the endpoint now, so an address it has learned since
// the last read is in this answer.
let ticket = crate::NestriTicket::new(endpoint.addr(), stream_name.clone());
if let Err(e) = stream.write_all(format!("{ticket}\n").as_bytes()).await {
tracing::warn!("could not write ticket to IPC: {e}");
}

12
apps/neshub/src/main.rs
View File

@@ -207,7 +207,10 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
// ── Accept mode: generate ticket, wait for desktop-app to connect ─────
let stream_name = ticket::generate_stream_name();
let ticket = NestriTicket::new(endpoint_addr, stream_name);
// For the log line below only. What a reader of the socket gets is built
// per read from the endpoint itself, because the addresses this can be
// reached at are not all known yet.
let ticket = NestriTicket::new(endpoint_addr, stream_name.clone());
tracing::info!("╔═══════════════╗");
tracing::info!("║ NESTRI TICKET ║");
@@ -245,7 +248,12 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let ticket_ipc = args.ticket_ipc.clone();
tokio::spawn({
async move { ipc_listener::run_ticket_ipc_listener(ticket_ipc, ticket).await }
// The endpoint rather than a ticket made from it: the addresses it can
// be reached at are not all known yet, and whoever reads this socket
// re-reads it so that a better one can replace the first.
let endpoint = endpoint.clone();
let stream_name = stream_name.clone();
async move { ipc_listener::run_ticket_ipc_listener(ticket_ipc, endpoint, stream_name).await }
});
// Accept loop

67
apps/nesinit/src/filesystems.rs
View File

@@ -63,14 +63,42 @@ const EARLY: &[Early] = &[
cost: "whatever serves this session's address cannot bind its socket, \
so the session never gets one",
},
// `/run` before anything under it, for the same reason `/proc` comes first:
// a directory cannot be created inside a mount that is not there, and the
// root it would otherwise land on is read-only.
Early {
source: "tmpfs",
target: "/run",
fstype: "tmpfs",
flags: NOSUID_NODEV,
// Octal, and without a leading zero on purpose: the kernel parses a
// tmpfs mode as octal either way, and this is the spelling `mount`
// itself documents.
data: "mode=755",
cost: "there is nowhere for a runtime socket to live, so neither the \
payload relay nor this session's address can be served",
},
// The relay's own directory, and it is deliberately **not** in the tree the
// session's shares live in.
//
// It was, and that was wrong in a way no test here would have caught: a
// fresh tmpfs over the share tree hides every directory the image prepared
// underneath it — the install, the user state, the work directory, and the
// mount point the log share is attached to from `fstab`. The box then has a
// socket and none of the places its workload expects to find its files, and
// the exact-path check below cannot notice, because what `fstab` mounts is
// a directory *inside* that tree rather than the tree itself.
//
// Owned by this process and writable by nothing else, which is what makes
// the socket in it unreplaceable. The workload reaches it because the
// directory is traversable and the socket itself is not restricted; see
// `payload::serve`.
Early {
source: "tmpfs",
target: crate::payload::DIRECTORY,
fstype: "tmpfs",
flags: NOSUID_NODEV | libc::MS_NOEXEC,
// Only this process and the workload it starts, and they are the only
// two that ever have business here.
data: "mode=0770",
data: "mode=755",
cost: "the payload relay cannot bind, so nothing reaches the workload \
over the channel",
},
@@ -198,6 +226,39 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(EARLY[0].target, "/proc");
}
/// A mount has to come after whatever it lives inside, or it is a
/// directory created on a read-only root and the mount fails.
#[test]
fn nothing_is_mounted_before_the_mount_it_lives_inside() {
for (i, early) in EARLY.iter().enumerate() {
for other in &EARLY[i + 1..] {
assert!(
!early.target.starts_with(&format!("{}/", other.target)),
"{} is mounted before {}, which contains it",
early.target,
other.target
);
}
}
}
/// **Nothing here may be mounted over the tree the session's shares live
/// in.** A fresh tmpfs there hides every directory the image prepared
/// underneath — the install, the user state, the work directory, and the
/// mount point the log share attaches to — and the exact-path check cannot
/// notice, because what is mounted from `fstab` is a directory inside that
/// tree rather than the tree itself. So a box would come up with a socket
/// and without any of the places its workload looks for its files.
#[test]
fn the_share_tree_is_never_mounted_over() {
for early in EARLY {
assert_ne!(
early.target, "/nestri",
"this hides the directories the image prepared for a session"
);
}
}
/// The relay's directory is the one this cannot hardcode: it belongs to
/// `payload`, and a rename there that missed this file would take the
/// relay down again in exactly the way this exists to prevent.

12
apps/nesinit/src/main.rs
View File

@@ -114,10 +114,18 @@ async fn guest(waiters: &Waiters, workload: &mut Process) -> anyhow::Result<Outc
// whatever serves the address may bind the moment it comes up, and nothing
// here should be the reason a session waits to be reachable.
let (found_tx, mut found_rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(ADDRESS_DEPTH);
tokio::spawn(ticket::carry(PathBuf::from(ticket::SOCKET), found_tx));
// Which user the carrier must not accept an address from. Empty until the
// descriptor names it, which is also when the workload that could abuse it
// is started -- so there is nothing to refuse before it is filled in.
let untrusted = ticket::Untrusted::unknown();
tokio::spawn(ticket::carry(
PathBuf::from(ticket::SOCKET),
found_tx,
untrusted.clone(),
));
let outcome = tokio::select! {
outcome = session::run(channel, workload, &mut ports, &mut found_rx) => outcome?,
outcome = session::run(channel, workload, &mut ports, &mut found_rx, &untrusted) => outcome?,
signal = asked_to_stop() => {
signal?;
tracing::info!("asked to stop");

24
apps/nesinit/src/payload.rs
View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
// anything above it.
use std::io;
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use std::path::Path;
use nesprotocol::lifecycle::{Payload, from_line, to_line};
@@ -22,10 +23,18 @@ use tokio::sync::mpsc::{Receiver, Sender};
/// is read-only, so this is a tmpfs that `filesystems` puts there, and a
/// rename here that did not reach the mount table would take the relay down
/// with an `EROFS` that looks like nothing to do with a path.
pub const DIRECTORY: &str = "/nestri";
///
/// **Under `/run` rather than in the tree the session's shares live in**, and
/// that was a correction. Putting a fresh tmpfs on the share tree hid every
/// directory the image had prepared underneath it — the install, the user
/// state, the work directory and the log share's own mount point — so a box
/// gained a socket and lost the places its workload was supposed to find its
/// files. `/run` is where a runtime socket belongs, it is a tmpfs already, and
/// nothing else is mounted inside it.
pub const DIRECTORY: &str = "/run/nestri";
/// Where the workload finds the relay.
pub const SOCKET: &str = "/nestri/payload.sock";
pub const SOCKET: &str = "/run/nestri/payload.sock";
/// The longest envelope this will assemble before giving up on the connection.
///
@@ -63,6 +72,17 @@ pub async fn serve(
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
let listener = UnixListener::bind(path)?;
// The workload does not run as this process does, and it has to be able to
// connect. It reaches the socket through a directory this process owns and
// nothing else may write to, so the permission that matters is on the
// socket rather than on the path: the directory is what stops anybody
// replacing this listener, and this is what lets the workload talk to it.
//
// Without it the workload gets `EACCES` on connect and the payload layer
// is dead in both directions, silently, because nothing in the guest is
// waiting to be told about a relay it cannot reach.
std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o666))?;
loop {
let stream = tokio::select! {
accepted = listener.accept() => accepted?.0,

121
apps/nesinit/src/session.rs
View File

@@ -41,12 +41,13 @@ pub async fn run<C, W>(
workload: &mut W,
payload: &mut Ports,
addresses: &mut Receiver<String>,
untrusted: &crate::ticket::Untrusted,
) -> std::io::Result<Outcome>
where
C: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite,
W: Workload,
{
match converse(channel, workload, payload, addresses).await {
match converse(channel, workload, payload, addresses, untrusted).await {
Err(error) if channel_gone(&error) => {
// A caller that has stopped reading has also stopped being able to
// tell us to stop, which is the same situation as the channel
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ async fn converse<C, W>(
workload: &mut W,
payload: &mut Ports,
addresses: &mut Receiver<String>,
untrusted: &crate::ticket::Untrusted,
) -> std::io::Result<Outcome>
where
C: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite,
@@ -186,6 +188,11 @@ where
}
}
// Before the workload exists, so there is no window in which
// it is running and something else would still be trusted to
// serve this session's address.
untrusted.is(descriptor.exec.uid);
match workload.start(&descriptor.exec) {
Ok(exited) => {
send(&mut writer, &GuestToHost::Started).await?;
@@ -354,7 +361,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
let outcome = run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
let outcome = run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
(outcome, workload)
@@ -385,7 +398,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut found_rx)
run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut found_rx,
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
});
@@ -436,7 +455,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut found_rx)
run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut found_rx,
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
});
@@ -462,7 +487,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
let outcome = run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
let outcome = run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
(outcome, workload)
@@ -490,7 +521,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_at_once(Exit::code(3));
let outcome = run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
let outcome = run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
(outcome, workload)
@@ -528,7 +565,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_at_once(Exit::signal(9));
run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
});
@@ -561,7 +604,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
let outcome = run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
let outcome = run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
(outcome, workload)
@@ -589,7 +638,13 @@ mod tests {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_at_once(Exit::code(0));
workload.mount_failure = Some(Failure::new("EACCES: /mnt/user"));
let outcome = run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
let outcome = run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
(outcome, workload)
@@ -626,7 +681,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
});
@@ -651,7 +712,13 @@ mod tests {
let session = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
let outcome = run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
let outcome = run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
(outcome, workload)
@@ -685,7 +752,13 @@ mod tests {
let (mut ports, _to_workload, _from_workload) = ports();
let mut workload = Double::exits_at_once(Exit::code(0));
workload.start_failure = Some(Failure::new("ENOENT: /usr/bin/workload"));
let outcome = run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
let outcome = run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
(outcome, workload)
@@ -729,7 +802,13 @@ mod tests {
from_workload: up_rx,
};
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
});
@@ -780,7 +859,13 @@ mod tests {
from_workload: up_rx,
};
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
});
@@ -828,7 +913,13 @@ mod tests {
from_workload: up_rx,
};
let mut workload = Double::exits_when_stopped(Exit::code(0));
run(guest, &mut workload, &mut ports, &mut nowhere())
run(
guest,
&mut workload,
&mut ports,
&mut nowhere(),
&crate::ticket::Untrusted::unknown(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
});

192
apps/nesinit/src/ticket.rs
View File

@@ -22,8 +22,24 @@
// long-lived one. Dialling also means a server that has not bound yet is an
// error this retries, rather than a connection that has to be waited for
// without knowing whether it is coming.
//
// # Who is allowed to answer
//
// Dialling a path means trusting whoever is behind it, and an address is the
// capability to reach this session — so the wrong answer here does not break a
// session, it hands one to somebody else. The workload runs arbitrary code, and
// on a writable directory it can unlink whatever bound the socket and bind a
// replacement; every read after that returns an address of its choosing, and
// the client outside connects there instead.
//
// So the peer's credentials are checked and an answer from the workload's own
// user is refused. That check is only as good as the workload having a user of
// its own: run it as the same user as the process serving the address and
// nothing can tell the two apart, which is [`Peer::indistinguishable`] and is
// said out loud at boot rather than discovered later.
use std::io;
use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::Duration;
@@ -57,16 +73,66 @@ const PATIENCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
/// buffer is the one the kernel has been told not to kill.
const LONGEST: u64 = 8 * 1024;
/// Who may not serve this session's address.
///
/// The workload's user, and nothing else is excluded — this is not an allow
/// list of trusted uids, because init does not know which user an image happens
/// to run its media components as, and inventing one here would be a second
/// place for that to be configured wrongly.
///
/// Shared and filled in later, because the carrier starts before the descriptor
/// that names the user arrives. That leaves no gap: a workload cannot serve
/// anything before it is started, and it is started from the same descriptor,
/// which sets this first.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
pub struct Untrusted(std::sync::Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32>);
/// No workload has been started, so there is no untrusted user yet.
const NOBODY: u32 = u32::MAX;
impl Untrusted {
pub fn unknown() -> Self {
Self(std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(
NOBODY,
)))
}
/// Name the user the workload runs as. Called before it is started.
pub fn is(&self, uid: u32) {
self.0.store(uid, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Release);
if uid == 0 {
tracing::warn!(
"the workload runs as root, so an address it serves cannot be \
told apart from a real one. Give it a user of its own."
);
}
}
/// The uid to refuse, or `None` when refusing anything would be wrong.
///
/// `None` covers two cases that want the same answer for different reasons:
/// nothing has been started yet, so no peer can be the workload; and the
/// workload runs as `root`, which is every user at once — refusing root
/// would refuse whatever legitimately serves the address as well. The uid
/// being shared is the thing an operator has to fix, and `is` says so.
fn refuse(&self) -> Option<u32> {
match self.0.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
NOBODY | 0 => None,
uid => Some(uid),
}
}
}
/// Forward every new address for as long as the session lasts.
///
/// Never returns on its own. A server that is not there yet, or has gone away,
/// is retried at the next interval — there is nothing here worth ending a
/// running session over, and an address that stops being re-offered does not
/// stop being correct.
pub async fn carry(path: PathBuf, out: Sender<String>) {
pub async fn carry(path: PathBuf, out: Sender<String>, untrusted: Untrusted) {
let mut sent: Option<String> = None;
loop {
match look(&path).await {
match look(&path, &untrusted).await {
Ok(current) if Some(&current) != sent.as_ref() => {
// The address itself is not logged. It is a capability to reach
// this session, and a log inside the guest is the one place it
@@ -82,6 +148,14 @@ pub async fn carry(path: PathBuf, out: Sender<String>) {
sent = Some(current);
}
Ok(_) => {}
// Not the same as no address yet, and it must not be logged as
// though it were: this says something *is* serving an address and
// it is the one thing that may not. A session with no address at
// all is a legible failure; a session pointed somewhere else is
// not, so this is the line that has to be found afterwards.
Err(error) if error.kind() == io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied => {
tracing::error!(%error, "refusing an address for this session");
}
Err(error) => {
// Expected until whatever serves the address has bound, so it
// is not a warning the first several times. It stays at this
@@ -95,8 +169,8 @@ pub async fn carry(path: PathBuf, out: Sender<String>) {
}
/// One look at the socket, abandoned if it takes longer than [`PATIENCE`].
async fn look(path: &Path) -> io::Result<String> {
match tokio::time::timeout(PATIENCE, read(path)).await {
async fn look(path: &Path, untrusted: &Untrusted) -> io::Result<String> {
match tokio::time::timeout(PATIENCE, read(path, untrusted)).await {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(_) => Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::TimedOut,
@@ -106,8 +180,22 @@ async fn look(path: &Path) -> io::Result<String> {
}
/// One line from the socket, which is the whole protocol.
async fn read(path: &Path) -> io::Result<String> {
async fn read(path: &Path, untrusted: &Untrusted) -> io::Result<String> {
let stream = UnixStream::connect(path).await?;
// Before a byte is read. The kernel answers this about the socket's peer
// rather than about the path, so it cannot be spoofed by whoever holds the
// path — which is the whole reason the check is worth anything.
if let Some(refuse) = untrusted.refuse()
&& peer_uid(&stream)? == refuse
{
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
"the workload is serving this session's address, which would point \
a client at whatever it chose",
));
}
let mut line = String::new();
BufReader::new(stream.take(LONGEST))
.read_line(&mut line)
@@ -122,6 +210,35 @@ async fn read(path: &Path) -> io::Result<String> {
Ok(line)
}
/// The uid of the process on the other end of a connected unix socket.
///
/// From the kernel, at connect time, and not from anything the peer says about
/// itself. `SO_PEERCRED` records who held the other end when it connected, so a
/// process cannot claim a uid it does not have.
fn peer_uid(stream: &UnixStream) -> io::Result<u32> {
let mut credentials = libc::ucred {
pid: 0,
uid: u32::MAX,
gid: u32::MAX,
};
let mut length = std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>() as libc::socklen_t;
// SAFETY: a connected socket this function borrows, and an out-parameter of
// exactly the length being passed.
let rc = unsafe {
libc::getsockopt(
stream.as_raw_fd(),
libc::SOL_SOCKET,
libc::SO_PEERCRED,
(&raw mut credentials).cast::<libc::c_void>(),
&raw mut length,
)
};
if rc != 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
Ok(credentials.uid)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -160,7 +277,7 @@ mod tests {
serve(path.clone(), vec![Some("nestri:abc".into())]);
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(4);
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx));
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx, Untrusted::unknown()));
let first = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), rx.recv())
.await
@@ -191,7 +308,7 @@ mod tests {
);
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(4);
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx));
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx, Untrusted::unknown()));
let mut seen = Vec::new();
while seen.len() < 2 {
@@ -205,13 +322,68 @@ mod tests {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
}
/// The peer's user decides whether an address is trusted, and this process
/// is the peer in a test — so naming *it* as the workload is a real refusal
/// of a real connection, not a stubbed one.
///
/// The attack this closes: the workload unlinks whatever bound the socket,
/// binds its own, and every read afterwards hands the client an address of
/// the workload's choosing.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_address_served_by_the_workload_is_refused() {
let path = scratch("hostile");
serve(path.clone(), vec![Some("nestri:attacker".into())]);
// SAFETY: reading this process's own uid cannot fail.
let ours = unsafe { libc::getuid() };
let untrusted = Untrusted::unknown();
untrusted.is(ours);
let error = look(&path, &untrusted)
.await
.expect_err("an address from the workload's own user was accepted");
assert_eq!(error.kind(), io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied);
// And the same socket is read happily once the workload is somebody
// else, which is what shows the refusal is about the peer and not about
// the socket.
let elsewhere = Untrusted::unknown();
elsewhere.is(ours + 1);
assert_eq!(look(&path, &elsewhere).await.unwrap(), "nestri:attacker");
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
}
/// Before a workload is started there is nothing to refuse, and refusing
/// anything then would mean no session ever got an address.
#[tokio::test]
async fn nothing_is_refused_before_a_workload_exists() {
let path = scratch("early");
serve(path.clone(), vec![Some("nestri:real".into())]);
let untrusted = Untrusted::unknown();
assert_eq!(untrusted.refuse(), None);
assert_eq!(look(&path, &untrusted).await.unwrap(), "nestri:real");
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
}
/// A workload running as root is every user at once, so refusing root would
/// refuse whatever legitimately serves the address too. The check stands
/// down and `is` warns instead — the uid being shared is the operator's to
/// fix and this is not the place to fail closed over it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_root_workload_leaves_nothing_to_tell_apart() {
let untrusted = Untrusted::unknown();
untrusted.is(0);
assert_eq!(untrusted.refuse(), None);
}
/// Nothing serving the socket yet is the ordinary case at boot, not a
/// failure: this starts before whatever binds it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_socket_that_is_not_there_yet_is_waited_out_rather_than_failed() {
let path = scratch("late");
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(4);
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx));
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx, Untrusted::unknown()));
tokio::time::sleep(EVERY * 2).await;
serve(path.clone(), vec![Some("nestri:late".into())]);
@@ -253,7 +425,7 @@ mod tests {
}
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(4);
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx));
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx, Untrusted::unknown()));
let first = tokio::time::timeout(PATIENCE + EVERY * 4, rx.recv())
.await
@@ -271,7 +443,7 @@ mod tests {
serve(path.clone(), vec![None, Some("nestri:real".into())]);
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(4);
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx));
tokio::spawn(carry(path.clone(), tx, Untrusted::unknown()));
let first = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), rx.recv())
.await

16
build/Dockerfile
View File

@@ -145,9 +145,23 @@ RUN pacman -Syu --noconfirm --needed \
# groupadd -f so this is idempotent whether or not udev's rules already
# created these.
#
# **Two users, and they must stay two.** `nestri` runs the services that come
# with this image; `nesplay` is who a workload runs as. Sharing one user between
# them is what lets workload code impersonate a service — it can replace the
# socket a service listens on and answer in its place, and the answer that
# matters is the address a client is told to connect to. Init refuses an address
# served by the workload's own user, so a single shared user does not merely
# weaken that check, it makes every session fail it.
#
# The uid a workload actually runs as is chosen by whoever asks for the box, not
# here; this account exists so that the number has a home, a shell and a name in
# `ps`, and so the separation has somewhere to be written down.
RUN groupadd -f audio && groupadd -f video && groupadd -f input && groupadd -f render && \
useradd -m -u 1000 -s /bin/bash nestri && \
for g in audio video input render; do gpasswd -a nestri "$g" >/dev/null; done
for g in audio video input render; do gpasswd -a nestri "$g" >/dev/null; done && \
useradd -m -u 1001 -s /bin/bash nesplay && \
for g in audio video input render; do gpasswd -a nesplay "$g" >/dev/null; done
# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────