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Two changes to who may start a flow here, and where a refusal is delivered. A host reached at its own hostname sits on a different registrable domain from this issuer, deliberately: that is what stops a cookie set there from ever reaching this one. The default rule allows a redirect back to whatever hostname the request arrived on, so it refused exactly the case the separation created. Which is a real problem rather than a theoretical one, because a session cookie without a Domain attribute is host-only, so a browser arriving at one of those hostnames for the first time carries no cookie whether or not it is signed in, and sending it here to sign in again changes nothing. So a client id that is a single hostname under that zone, whose redirect_uri is https and that same hostname at one reserved path, is allowed. Making the client id the hostname is the load-bearing part: a token's audience is its client id, so the session that comes back is bound to the host it will live on and is not a credential anywhere else. Separately, and worth its own paragraph: a refused client's redirect_uri was still used to report the refusal. The check that approves that URI is the one that just failed, so /authorize was an open redirector to anywhere at all -- no sign-in required, on the hostname people are asked to type a password into. It is now a page here. Before: GET /authorize?client_id=web&redirect_uri=https://somewhere.example/callback -> 302 https://somewhere.example/callback?error=unauthorized_client
apps/auth
The authentication service for Nestri, built on
@nestri/auth (OpenAuth-style issuer). One
handler, run either as a Cloudflare Worker or as an ordinary HTTP server.
What it does
Hosts the OAuth issuer and the sign-in UI:
- Email code — the only provider, on purpose. Verifying an email address is the one thing that
brings an account into existence, so an account is exactly as recoverable as its email. The
successcallback finds or creates theUserrow, ensures a personal team exists, and issues a JWTusersubject containing{ userID, linkedAccountID }. - Device authorization grant (RFC 8628) — for programs with no browser. A client starts a grant,
a person approves it in a browser, and the client collects tokens by polling. Connecting a Steam
account is not a sign-in and lives in
apps/apiinstead, against a user who already exists.
Key details
- All issuer state is in Postgres. There is no key-value binding. Signing keys, authorization
codes, refresh tokens and device grants each have a table, because each is either a record whose
loss ends every session (the keys) or one with a transition that must happen exactly once while
two callers are touching it — a code is redeemed once, a refresh token is spent once, a grant is
approved once. A store that reads and writes whole records cannot promise that. What is left in
the generic
auth_kvtable is the rate-limit counters, which are allowed to be approximate. - Authorization codes, refresh tokens and device codes are stored as hashes. Each is a bearer credential, so what is kept is enough to recognise one and not enough to present it.
- JWT subjects are defined in
@nestri/core/auth/subjects. - The API verifies tokens against this issuer through
AUTH_ISSUER_URL, which must be this service's public URL: a token carries the address it was minted through and the check is literal.
Structure
src/index.ts # The handler: issuer config, stores, success callback
src/server.ts # The same handler behind a listening socket
src/email.ts # Verification code delivery
wrangler.jsonc # Worker configuration, one environment per stage
Dockerfile # The container, built from the repository root
test/
Running
bun run dev # under the Workers runtime, on :1337
bun run serve # as a plain process, on $PORT (default 1337)
Its only stateful dependency is Postgres — as a HYPERDRIVE binding on Workers, or as
DATABASE_URL anywhere else — alongside the mail settings. Full list and deployment steps:
docs/deploy.md.