Reissue internally revokes the old cert (revoke_issued), which makes the published CRL immediately stale, but neither the CLI --reissue path nor the TUI renew flow ever regenerated/copied it — only standalone revoke and "Regenerate CRL" did. A cert revoked as part of a reissue could keep authenticating against OpenVPN until someone remembered to regenerate the CRL by hand. Both reissue paths now call gen_crl()+copy_crl() right after a successful revoke_issued(), same as standalone revoke. This isn't gated on the subsequent build_client_full() succeeding, since the CRL is already stale the moment the old cert is revoked. A CRL-regen failure here is reported as a warning and the reissue continues to build the replacement cert — a new cert is more urgent than a fresh CRL, and "Regenerate CRL"/--gen-crl remain available to retry. Also add a RESTORECON_BINARY setting (default "restorecon", "" to disable): copy_crl() now runs it on the destination file after every copy, everywhere copy_crl() is called. Best-effort like is_ca_key_encrypted() — a missing/misconfigured binary is swallowed rather than breaking CRL deployment on non-SELinux systems. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
21 KiB
21 KiB